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The globalization of ﬁnancial markets, made possible
largely through market deregulation and technologi-
cal gains, has been widely recognized. Increased
trading and derivatives activities, in particular, are
often cited as making ﬁnancial markets more liquid
and efﬁcient and bringing markets throughout the
world closer together. International lending by U.S.
and foreign banks, along with international trade and
the innovative ﬁnancing necessary to support trade
and economic growth, has also grown rapidly in
recent decades.
Nevertheless, the extent of global markets and
economies can be exaggerated, and trends can be
reversed. Lenders and investors constantly reassess
risks, and government actions affect the openness and
attractiveness of markets to outsiders. The record of
international banking, and of international trade in
general, is not one of uninterrupted growth, as wars,
social and political forces, and shifting economic and
ﬁnancial conditions of countries change markets and
business patterns.
A review of data on the activities of U.S. banks
abroad and foreign banks in the United States can
reveal much about the progress that banks and gov-
ernments are making in developing truly internation-
ally diversiﬁed banking markets and institutions. The
data can also highlight trends in international lend-
ing and in the structuring of worldwide operations by
ﬁnancial institutions. Walter Bagehot, the renowned
nineteenth-century economist, once stated that the
characteristic danger of great nations is that they may
at last fail from not comprehending the great insti-
tutions they have created. It is useful, therefore, to
understand the structure and evolution of the banking
organizations that play vital roles in the world econ-
omy. Such background aids in evaluating events as
they unfold.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
For U.S. banks, the 1960s and 1970s were years of
rapid growth in international banking. The few truly
global ones, which had long before ventured abroad,
reﬁned their networks and penetrated foreign markets
more deeply. Other large regional and money center
banks also expanded their operations, though they
largely conﬁned their activities to foreign ﬁnancial
centers and to commercial lending and wholesale
ﬁnancial business.
Meanwhile (mostly in the 1970s), many smaller
U.S. regional institutions began to recognize the bene-
ﬁts of a foreign presence, principally to accommodate
and retain domestic customers whose activities were
beginning to extend beyond U.S. borders. Some of
these banks established full-service branches, typi-
cally in European cities, but most of them sought
only ‘‘shell branches’’ in Caribbean centers as a
means of gaining access to Eurodollar markets.1
Consequently, the number of U.S. banks having
foreign branches began to grow. In late 1965, only
13 U.S. banks had foreign branches, and most of
those had only a few; the branches’ assets totaled
less than $10 billion. By 1970, 79 banks had foreign
branches, with assets totaling $53 billion. Ten years
later, 159 banks—nearly every U.S. bank having
assets of more than $2 billion—had at least one
foreign branch, the number of branches had grown
to 787, and combined branch assets exceeded
$340 billion.
Before the 1960s, few U.S. banks owned subsidi-
aries abroad, and total subsidiary assets in 1965 were
less than $3 billion. During the 1970s, however,
subsidiaries also began to grow, building assets to
$39 billion by 1975 and to more than $80 billion by
1980. They typically conducted commercial or mer-
chant banking or pursued local retail business.
1. Shell branches are so named because they are merely booking
centers. Bank personnel do not conduct operations on site at these
branches, but rather book balances at these ofﬁces from other
locations.By the early 1980s, strains from the rapid growth
of international banking were beginning to show.
Borrowers in many emerging economies were having
difﬁculty servicing their debt, and the specter of
losses loomed. By the end of the decade, despite
efforts by creditor banks worldwide to postpone or
avoid them, many of those losses were realized,
requiring signiﬁcant charge-offs and additional loss
reserves. The threat of still further large losses on
loans to developing countries did not disappear until
the early 1990s, when improving domestic economic
conditions and strong earnings enabled U.S. banks to
charge off additional foreign loans and to put those
problems behind them.
Banks of other countries—particularly European
banks—have engaged in international banking for
hundreds of years. For a time, they generally trailed
the largest U.S. banks in creating worldwide branch
networks. But during the late 1970s they, too, became
more expansive and began to close the gap. Not sur-
prisingly, considering the prominence of U.S. busi-
nesses and ﬁnancial markets, much of the foreign
bank growth was in the United States.
The resulting increase in the U.S. market share
controlled by foreign banks, fueled by some notable
acquisitions of U.S. banks, generated considerable
political debate and in 1978 spurred the Congress to
enact legislation intended to make more equitable a
competitive environment seen to favor foreign banks.
The legislation (the International Banking Act of
1978) was aimed at eliminating the advantages
enjoyed by foreign banks and at strengthening the
supervisory oversight of those banks’ U.S. activities,
not at barring their entry or at erecting barriers against
them. Subsequently, although they had lost some
advantages, the number of foreign banks operating
in U.S. markets and their market share continued
to grow—from 153 banks and 13 percent of U.S.
domestic banking assets at the end of 1980 to 283
banks and 24 percent ten years later.
STRUCTURAL FRAMEWORK
FOR INTERNATIONAL BANKING
The institutional structure for international banking
by U.S. banks is in large part a reﬂection of efforts to
restrain banking power. Throughout this country’s
history, government policy has sought to restrain
concentration in banking and other ﬁnancial activi-
ties. Until 1997, for example, U.S. banks generally
were not allowed to branch across state lines
(although, by then, their parent holding companies
could own banks in different states). For much of this
century, U.S. banks have also generally been barred
from underwriting corporate securities and from con-
ducting other ﬁnancial activities typically permissible
for foreign banks.
Although such restrictions helped diffuse ﬁnancial
power, they also, some observers argued, hindered
U.S. banks from providing international banking ser-
vices to U.S. customers and from competing effec-
tively in foreign markets with institutions that offered
a greater range of ﬁnancial services. As early as
1919 these concerns led to enactment of sec-
tion 25(a) of the Federal Reserve Act (the portion
known as the ‘‘Edge Act’’) and, through limited-
purpose Edge corporations, to meaningful relief from
restrictions on branching interstate and investing
abroad. Although some of the structures that devel-
oped over the years to facilitate international banking
by U.S. banks are unique to U.S. banking, the main
types of ofﬁces used by U.S. banks and bank holding
companies to engage in international banking are also
used by foreign banks—namely, branches, separately
incorporated subsidiaries, joint venture companies,
and simple representative ofﬁces.
Foreign Ofﬁces
Foreign branch ofﬁces are the most important, and in
most instances the preferred, vehicle through which
U.S. banks provide international banking services, for
several reasons. First, they are, legally, integral parts
of the corporate bank and have the full authority
to represent and commit the bank—an advantage in
many commercial and interbank situations. For exam-
ple, the lending limits imposed by a host country on
the local branches of a foreign bank are ordinarily
based on the bank’s worldwide capital, not on some
lower level of capital imputed from an individual
branch’s own balance sheet.2 Also, the activities of
branches are typically more easily integrated into the
internal reporting and control procedures of the bank
than are the activities of other types of ofﬁces, and
branches accommodate a more streamlined organiza-
tional structure.
Many U.S. banks also ﬁnd it necessary to operate
abroad through separately incorporated, separately
capitalized foreign subsidiaries. Most of the subsidi-
aries are wholly owned by the U.S. banking parent;
all are at least majority owned and controlled by the
parent. Although a subsidiary’s ﬁnancial strength and
2. In an exception to this general practice, Argentina imposes
prudential lending limits on foreign bank branches that are based on
local paid-in capital, not on the parent bank’s capital.
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closely tied to its parent’s, in the legal sense a subsid-
iary could survive on its own. Banks (or bank holding
companies) establish or acquire foreign subsidiaries
for any of several reasons:3
• U.S. or foreign tax or banking laws favor opera-
tions through subsidiaries
• The host government does not permit foreign
banks to have local branches
• The parent bank seeks consumer business in the
foreign market or a local image, or it has other
specialized business that is facilitated by separate
incorporation
• U.S. laws prohibit branches from engaging in
certain activities that subsidiaries may perform, for
example, underwriting corporate debt
• Acquiring an established institution helps the
purchaser gain an immediate, and perhaps sizable,
presence in the market.
Limited liability is another reason for establish-
ing separately incorporated subsidiaries. Although
that is sometimes a consideration for banking
organizations—for example, in the case of special-
ized leasing company subsidiaries—it is generally
not an important factor in planning banking net-
works. Financial institutions depend on raising large
sums daily, and they recognize that a good reputation
is essential for long-term viability. The incentive to
support ailing subsidiaries is strong, limited liability
notwithstanding.
Banks also engage in international banking through
foreign joint ventures. These foreign companies, in
which the U.S. bank or bank holding company has a
noncontrolling 20 percent to 50 percent investment,
offer several advantages and serve the needs of cer-
tain banks. Investing banks can combine their exper-
tise and resources while sharing the risks in what may
be for them a relatively new business. Also, U.S.
regulations allow banks to invest in a broader range
of foreign activities if the investments do not repre-
sent controlling interests.
Foreign joint ventures were more popular in the
1970s, when many U.S. banks were beginning to
enter international banking, than they are now. At
that time the advantages of joint ventures were
appealing, and banks sought partners both domes-
tically and abroad. However, when the ventures
encountered problems, as many eventually did, the
U.S. banks were typically the only investors able to
help. In virtually every case, they provided the assis-
tance necessary to protect their reputations in ﬁnan-
cial markets, sometimes doing so at signiﬁcant cost.
Since the 1970s, joint ventures have been of little
interest to U.S. banks, and they are not discussed
further.
Some banks engage in international banking in
some locales through simple representative ofﬁces.
The principal role of the bank ‘‘representatives’’ that
staff these ofﬁces is to promote the bank’s interest in
the local market—generating business, dealing with
local authorities and customers, and providing infor-
mation about local business conditions to the bank’s
other ofﬁces. Representative ofﬁces are not licensed
or chartered and may not accept deposits or make
loans. Indeed, they have no ﬁnancial statements of
their own, and they direct any business they generate
to other ofﬁces or afﬁliates of the bank.
U.S. Ofﬁces
Although U.S. banking organizations conduct most of
their international activities through foreign branches
and subsidiaries, they also handle much international
banking directly from domestic ofﬁces—the bank’s
head ofﬁce, an Edge corporation, or an international
banking facility. Banks need no foreign ofﬁce to issue
and process letters of credit, for example, or to pur-
chase international loans, trade foreign exchange,
take deposits from foreign sources, or place funds in
foreign banks. For these transactions, banks can typi-
cally accommodate customers through their head
ofﬁces and with the assistance of foreign correspon-
dent banks.
Edge (and agreement) corporations are subsidi-
aries that enable banks to conduct international bank-
ing business outside their home states and to invest
abroad in a wider range of activities than is otherwise
permissible for U.S. banks.4 Banking and investing
functions are almost always conducted by separate
Edge corporations. Banking Edges are essentially
limited-purpose banks; they may accept deposits and
offer a full range of banking services, but the busi-
ness must be linked to a foreign or international
transaction. Nonbanking (or ‘‘investment’’) Edge cor-
porations are U.S. subsidiaries through which banks
hold most of their foreign subsidiaries and other
foreign investments.
3. James V. Houpt and Michael G. Martinson, Foreign Subsidiaries
of U.S. Banking Organizations, Staff Studies 120 (Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, 1982).
4. Edge corporations take their name from Senator Walter Edge of
New Jersey, who sponsored the section 25(a) amendment to the
Federal Reserve Act in 1919 that gave rise to these corporations.
Agreement corporations are state-chartered companies that are granted
the same powers as Edge corporations.
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existed only since 1981, have no separate organiza-
tional identity but are merely separate sets of
accounts maintained by their establishing (or ‘‘host’’)
banking ofﬁces. IBFs are attractive to banks for sev-
eral reasons. First, their deposits are exempt from any
reserve requirements and are not assessed for (nor are
they covered by) federal deposit insurance. Also, in
some states the earnings derived from balances
booked in IBFs receive favorable state tax treatment.
To qualify for placement in an IBF, a banking trans-
action must meet several tests to ensure that it is
international and does not directly affect domestic
ﬁnancial markets. IBFs have been described as effec-
tively being shell branches, similar to those in the
Caribbean. The only difference is that IBF balances
are assets or obligations of ofﬁces located in the
United States rather than abroad.
U.S. BANK INVOLVEMENT
IN INTERNATIONAL BANKING MARKETS
The state of international banking can be examined in
two ways: (1) by looking at the number and size of
ofﬁces of different types—for example, the assets of
foreign branches, subsidiaries, and other foreign
ofﬁces and the volume of internationally related
credit extended directly from the head ofﬁce, and
(2) by reviewing data on total credit exposure to
foreign parties, by country. Each approach has mer-
its. The former, which is based on ‘‘structure’’ data,
provides more information about, and therefore more
insights into, the operational strategies of banks and
the legal and regulatory framework in which they
operate. By considering activities whenever an inter-
national link exists, even if the customer is not for-
eign, it also produces a broader measure than the
second. Such a broader measure may be more appro-
priate because even loans to U.S. parties that are
booked abroad may be booked there because they are
ﬁnanced with funds raised abroad. Structure data
come from numerous sources, however, and reconcil-
ing the data can be difﬁcult and lead to unexplained
differences, even when the reporting forms are
designed to be compatible. The ‘‘country exposure’’
approach is more systematic because it relies on a
single, consolidated ﬁgure that reporting institutions
themselves generate to measure their foreign credit
and transfer risks.
This article reports both structure and country
exposure data. The former are available over a longer
period, and they identify the location and size of the
foreign operations. The latter show where the credit
and transfer risks lie, regardless of which ofﬁce gen-
erated the assets and where they are booked.
Extent of Operations
When examining the organizational structure of inter-
national banking, a question arises about which ﬁnan-
cial statistic best characterizes the role and impor-
tance of each type of ofﬁce. Amount of assets is an
obvious possibility, as it covers all the activities of an
ofﬁce and is a traditional measure of bank size.
However, the assets of an individual ofﬁce can
include signiﬁcant intracompany transactions and
may reﬂect mostly the bank’s internal funding prac-
tices. Those balances are important to understanding
a particular ofﬁce’s speciﬁc role, but they can also
mislead, and they are excluded from the consolidated
ﬁnancial statements that the bank presents to inves-
tors and to the public at large.
Amount of deposits is another common measure,
but it, too, is limited. For example, some foreign
subsidiaries are not banks and, therefore, do not have
deposits. Also, data on deposits cannot convey the
growing importance to banks of securities transac-
tions and off-balance-sheet derivatives activities.
A third measure, claims on unrelated parties,
excludes dealings with afﬁliates. The ﬁgures for these
assets for each type of ofﬁce can be summed to
produce a total that equals (conceptually) the consoli-
dated assets of the parent. However, this measure
considers only one side of the balance sheet and
therefore understates the role of ofﬁces that raise
funds and then transfer those funds to other ofﬁces of
the parent or to its subsidiaries.
A full range of statistics and other information is
needed to fully understand the importance and role
of any ofﬁce in a bank’s network, of course, but that
approach is beyond the scope of this article. The
discussion here is based on the two asset measures—
total assets and claims on unrelated parties.
To place the importance of different types of ofﬁces
in perspective, it helps to look at aggregate data on
claims on unrelated parties. By that measure, U.S.
banks and bank holding companies at the end of
1998 held an estimated $861 billion of international
banking assets through their U.S. and foreign ofﬁces
(table 1). That ﬁgure represented about 15 percent of
the assets of all U.S. banks and bank holding compa-
nies at the time. For some individual institutions,
however, international banking accounts for most of
their consolidated assets.
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The number and assets of foreign branches of U.S.
banks grew sharply throughout the 1960s and 1970s
but then stagnated and declined in the 1980s as
mounting problems with loans to developing coun-
tries dampened enthusiasm for foreign lending
(table 2). Regional institutions, in particular, reas-
sessed and restructured their international presence,
and many withdrew from international banking alto-
gether. This retrenchment, together with the large
number of bank mergers in the past decade, has
reduced the number of U.S. banks having foreign
branches nearly one-half since the mid-1980s, to
eighty-two banks at the end of 1998.
With fewer internationally active U.S. banks, the
number of foreign branches also declined and did not
surpass the peak levels of the mid-1980s until last
year. The new level (935 branches) was reached only
when both Citibank and BankBoston purchased
Argentine banks and converted scores of acquired
ofﬁces to branches of their own banks. At the end
of 1998, these branches, together with Argentine
branches previously established by the two banks,
accounted for nearly one-quarter of all foreign
branches of U.S. banks. That large share reﬂects both
banks’ long history in commercial and retail banking
in Argentina and that nation’s willingness to accom-
modate the banks’ preference for branch ofﬁces.
Although foreign branch assets also dipped in the
early 1990s, that amount has grown dramatically
over the long term, emphasizing the relatively mod-
est level of international banking activity that existed
only a few decades ago. From a base of $10 billion
in 1965, the total assets of branches have increased
more than seventyfold, reaching $705 billion at the
end of 1998. Even since 1993, branch assets have
nearly doubled. Unlike the growth in earlier periods,
1. International banking assets of U.S. insured commercial banks and bank holding companies, by type of ofﬁce,
selected years, 1980–98
Billions of dollars except as noted
Type of ofﬁce 1980 1985 1990 1995 1996 1997
1998
Amount Percent
Domestic ofﬁces of U.S. banks ........ 61.8 142.2 78.1 65.4 75.2 89.4 80.8 9.4
IBFs1 ............................. . . . 74.8 47.9 38.1 39.3 51.3 45.8 5.3
Other 2 ............................ 61.8 67.4 30.2 27.3 35.9 38.1 35.0 4.1
Foreign branches 3,4 .................. 292.8 243.3 217.6 360.1 405.0 462.1 430.6 49.9
Foreign subsidiaries 4,5 ............... 64.0 88.7 136.7 223.5 254.1 264.8 338.8 39.5
Banking Edge and agreement
corporations .................... 13.6 7.9 7.1 7.9 7.7 12.0 10.5 1.2
IBFs1 ............................. . . . 2.9 3.4 3.5 3.1 3.1 3.7 .4
Other 2 ............................ 13.6 5.0 3.7 4.4 4.6 8.9 6.8 .8
Total ................................ 432.2 482.1 439.5 656.9 742.1 828.2 860.6 100.0
Note. Data are as of December 31 and cover only claims on unrelated
parties. In this and subsequent tables, components may not sum to totals because
of rounding.
1. International banking facilities (IBFs) were not authorized until December
1981.
2. Extensions of credit to foreign parties booked outside IBFs, plus the
amount of international trade ﬁnancing indicated by the amount of customers’
liability on acceptances outstanding.
3. Covers foreign branches of only those banks that are members of the
Federal Reserve System; at the end of 1998, member banks accounted for
98 percent of all foreign branch assets of U.S. banks.
4. Figures for 1995 and later years are reduced to reﬂect further FIN 39
netting by the head ofﬁce or parent bank. See text note 5.
5. Covers foreign subsidiaries held directly by bank holding companies and
those held indirectly through banks or Edge corporations.
. . . Not applicable.
2. Foreign branches of U.S. insured commercial banks,
selected years, 1955–98















1955 ....... 7 115 2.0 n.a.
1960 ....... 8 131 3.5 n.a.
1965 ....... 13 211 9.8 n.a.
1970 ....... 79 532 52.6 n.a.
1975 ....... 126 762 162.7 n.a.
1980 ....... 159 787 343.5 292.8
1985 ....... 162 916 329.2 243.3
1990 ....... 122 833 304.4 217.6
1991 ....... 122 818 325.3 224.8
1992 ....... 115 787 311.0 218.8
1993 ....... 108 774 375.5 241.1
1994 ....... 106 781 506.2 316.0
1995 ....... 102 788 567.1 360.1
1996 ....... 93 820 615.4 405.0
1997 ....... 89 852 734.7 462.1
1998 ....... 82 935 704.5 430.6
Note. Data are as of December 31. Covers foreign branches of banks that are
members of the Federal Reserve System.
1. Figures for 1994 and later years are reduced to reﬂect further FIN 39
netting by the head ofﬁce or parent bank. For 1998, the reduction was $63 bil-
lion. See text note 5.
n.a. Not available.
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growth in recent years reﬂects trading activities and
a 1994 accounting change pertaining to derivatives
transactions.5
The growth of branch activities has varied consid-
erably by world region (chart 1, tables A.1 and A.2).
Outside the United States, the major countries of
Europe (especially the United Kingdom) have had
the largest, most developed, and most accessible
ﬁnancial markets. Mostly because of London’s role
in ﬁnancial markets, but also because of the tradition-
ally strong ties between Western Europe and the
United States, the assets of branches in Europe far
exceed those of branches in other regions.
From the late 1960s to the mid-1970s, European
branches accounted for 60 percent to almost 80 per-
cent of all foreign branch assets of U.S. banks. As
branches in the Caribbean offshore centers, Singa-
pore, and Japan began to grow, the relative impor-
tance of European branches (by that measure)
declined. Since the early 1980s, the distribution of
branch assets has changed little, with the European
ofﬁces holding 44 percent at the end of 1998 and the
Caribbean and Asian ofﬁces holding 26 percent and
21 percent respectively. Branches in Argentina and
other Latin American countries accounted for most of
the balance.
Foreign Subsidiaries
Although subsidiaries are generally smaller than
branches in terms of assets, they are in most cases
5. In 1994, banks implemented U.S. Financial Accounting Stan-
dards Board interpretation 39 (FIN 39), which clariﬁed the degree to
which they could net counterparty claims arising from trading and
derivatives activities and ended a practice known as ‘‘grand slam
netting.’’ Institutions had been effectively netting their total gains on
these activities with ‘‘offsetting’’ losses, regardless of counterparty.
FIN 39 clariﬁed that the netting of gains and losses was permissible
only by individual counterparty and required institutions to report the
result for each counterparty as either an asset or a liability. The revised
approach more accurately reﬂects the results of an institution’s trading
and derivatives activities and the counterparty risks the activities
represent, but it also increases the amount of consolidated assets
reported by the bank. Moreover, the calculations can substantially
increase the assets of individual ofﬁces that conduct these activities
(particularly ofﬁces in London) because more netting among numer-
ous counterparties is possible on a consolidated bankwide basis than is
possible for a given ofﬁce. As a result of their own (limited) netting
abilities, foreign branches and subsidiaries of U.S. banks reported total
trading assets (including the relevant revaluation gains) of $267 bil-
lion at the end of 1998. Further netting by the head ofﬁces reduced
that ﬁgure to $169 billion (as shown in table 5). The assets for 1994
and later years shown in tables 1 and 2 have also been adjusted to
reﬂect such nettings.
























































604 Federal Reserve Bulletin September 1999integral parts of a bank’s international banking net-
work. They supplement the parent’s branch activities
or extend its reach into local retail banking in ways
not practical through branches. Through its Regu-
lation K (International Banking Operations), the Fed-
eral Reserve Board requires that the activities of
foreign subsidiaries be ﬁnancial in nature, but within
that stricture it permits a broad range of activities. In
practice, most subsidiary activities have involved
some form of traditional banking or lending. More
recently, however, as the securities and trading activi-
ties of major U.S. banks have grown, so too have
these activities of their foreign subsidiaries.
Foreign subsidiaries have grown rapidly in recent
years: Their assets, including claims on afﬁliates,
climbed from $7 billion in 1970 to $81 billion by
1980, to $191 billion by 1990, and to $718 billion by
the end of 1998. As has been the case for foreign
branches, Europe has been the most attractive
location for subsidiaries, with those in the United
Kingdom overshadowing those in other countries
(table 3). Also like the growth of foreign branches,
the growth of subsidiaries reﬂects London’s role in
international ﬁnance (as well as the United King-
dom’s openness to U.S. banks).
Total assets provide an incomplete picture of
foreign subsidiaries, however, because of the
recent growth of trading activities—particularly in
London—and the role subsidiaries play in their
parents’ networks. Overall, nearly half the total assets
of foreign subsidiaries involve claims on related
parties. As noted, tax laws—U.S. state and local laws
as well as U.S. federal laws and international tax
treaties—sometimes have the effect of encouraging
banks to conduct business in subsidiaries rather than
branch ofﬁces. A bank’s past organizational structure
in a country, which itself has been inﬂuenced by past
and current tax and banking laws and regulations,
also affects decisions regarding where to book trans-
actions. Once staffed and operating, subsidiaries can
be costly to dismantle even when changing circum-
stances favor a different approach.
Foreign subsidiaries vary widely in size, depending
on their role. Some approach the size of large U.S.
banks, when measured by total assets (including
claims on afﬁliates). At the end of 1998, the 23 larg-
est foreign subsidiaries (those having assets of more
than $5 billion, about 2 percent of all such subsidi-
aries) accounted for 68 percent of all foreign subsidi-
ary assets. The nearly 800 subsidiaries having total
assets of less than $100 million (70 percent of all
foreign subsidiaries) held less than 2 percent of total
foreign subsidiary assets.
Edge Corporations
The initial purpose for banking Edge corporations
was to enable banks located outside New York State
to gain a banking presence in New York City—a
near-necessity for conducting international banking
and for trading in foreign exchange; without such
subsidiaries, past restrictions on interstate branching
would have prevented non–New York banks from
operating an international banking business in the
New York market. During the 1980s, in particular,
U.S. and foreign banks also used Edge corporations
to expand beyond their home states into regional
3. Foreign subsidiaries of U.S. banking organizations,
by location of subsidiary, year-end 1998
Billions of dollars except as noted





Europe ...................... 327 28.9 209.4 56.0 477.6
Belgium .................. 8 .7 2.5 .7 2.6
Czech Republic ........... 5 .4 1.4 .4 1.6
France .................... 26 2.3 5.8 1.5 12.1
Germany ................. 24 2.1 21.8 5.8 34.7
Luxembourg .............. 19 1.7 2.1 .6 8.0
Poland .................... 6 .5 1.8 .5 2.1
Spain ..................... 14 1.2 13.8 3.7 14.9
Switzerland ............... 23 2.0 13.5 3.6 19.6
United Kingdom .......... 110 9.7 136.3 36.4 358.3
Other ..................... 92 8.1 10.5 2.8 23.7
Offshore banking centers ..... 211 18.6 25.3 6.8 66.6
Bahamas ................. 19 1.7 3.7 1.0 5.7
Cayman Islands ........... 106 9.4 4.1 1.1 26.5
Channel Islands ........... 59 5.2 6.3 1.7 18.7
Singapore ................. 27 2.4 11.2 3.0 15.7
Latin America ............... 238 21.0 28.0 7.5 40.5
Brazil .................... 57 5.0 12.0 3.2 19.1
Chile ..................... 29 2.6 2.9 .8 4.3
Colombia ................. 12 1.1 1.5 .4 1.8
Mexico ................... 32 2.8 8.1 2.2 10.6
Other ..................... 108 9.5 3.5 .9 4.7
Asia/Paciﬁc ................. 151 13.3 40.3 10.8 46.6
Hong Kong ............... 64 5.6 9.0 2.4 11.6
Japan ..................... 21 1.9 24.4 6.5 26.3
Malaysia ................. 11 1.0 4.9 1.3 5.2
Other ..................... 55 4.9 2.0 .5 3.4
Middle East ................. 8 .7 13.3 3.6 13.4
Africa ...................... 12 1.1 .7 .2 1.0
Australia .................... 31 2.7 21.7 5.8 25.9
Canada ..................... 36 3.2 17.3 4.6 20.9
U.S. territories and other ..... 60 5.3 8.6 2.3 9.8
United States1 ............... 59 5.2 9.4 2.5 15.6
Total ....................... 1,133 100.0 373.9 2 100.0 717.9
1. Covers companies that are regulated as foreign subsidiaries by the Federal
Reserve even though they are domiciled in the United States. These companies
are subject to the limitations and conditions of Regulation K, which requires that
their activities be of a foreign or international nature. Many of them are leasing
and investment companies.
2. Amount differs from the amount shown in table 1 because the latter ﬁgure
was reduced by the estimated effect on subsidiaries of FIN 39.
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San Francisco.
The recent removal of federal interstate branching
restrictions would seem to undermine much of the
continuing appeal of banking Edge corporations, and,
indeed, their relative role in international banking has
declined. Nevertheless, more than thirty corporations
remain, operating mostly in New York and Miami.
At the end of 1998, they held $18 billion in assets
(including claims on afﬁliates), roughly their size
throughout the 1980s. Whereas banking Edges extend
the geographic reach of their parents, nonbanking, or
‘‘investment,’’ Edges expand the kinds of companies
in which their parent banks may invest. By law, U.S.
banks may invest abroad only in other banks.B y
investing indirectly through Edge corporations, they
may invest in virtually any type of foreign company,
provided it conducts no business in the United States
except that which is incidental to its foreign or inter-
national activities. (Through regulation, however, the
foreign subsidiaries of a bank’s Edge corporations
are restricted to ﬁnancial activities, as are foreign
subsidiaries owned directly by bank holding com-
panies, that is, not through a subsidiary bank.) At
the end of 1998, 70 percent of the assets of all for-
eign subsidiaries of U.S. banking organizations were
owned through Edge corporations.
International Banking Facilities
International banking facilities were popular from the
time their creation was authorized in 1981, and soon
225 U.S. banking institutions had established such
facilities, placing more than $60 billion in them.
However, their early growth was simply the result of
a transfer of eligible credits within banks. After peak-
ing at $79 billion in 1984, the IBF balances of U.S.
banks declined almost steadily, to $46 billion at the
end of 1998, as regional U.S. banks withdrew from
foreign lending. Because of the typically interna-
tional focus of their business, U.S. branches and
agencies of foreign banks (discussed later) make
much greater use of these facilities, holding $169 bil-
lion in them at the end of 1998.
Country Exposure
Data on the extent and size of the international opera-
tions of U.S. banks offer one perspective on growth
but provide no information on the nationality or type
of foreign borrower. U.S. banks book many foreign
loans in the United States, in offshore centers, and in
countries different from those of the borrowers. They
also extend loans denominated in currencies other
than the currency of the borrower’s home country.
Lending to foreign parties creates ‘‘country risk’’ and
also, depending on the currency, ‘‘transfer risk.’’6
Monitoring Country Exposure
To monitor country risk and transfer risk, U.S. bank-
ing agencies have for more than two decades col-
lected information from internationally active banks
about the domicile and nature of their foreign borrow-
ers. The information is collected through the quar-
terly Country Exposure Lending Survey and is pub-
lished quarterly in the E.16 statistical release of the
Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council.
Aggregate data from the survey, along with data from
similar surveys by foreign authorities in most other
major countries, are sent to the Bank for International
Settlements (BIS), which then compiles data on inter-
national lending by banks worldwide. The worldwide
ﬁgures indicate that U.S. banks account for about
10 percent of international lending by banks in BIS
reporting countries to parties in non–BIS reporting
countries.7 That share is similar to the share held by
French and Japanese banks and is materially smaller
than the share held by German banks.
Until recently, the supervisory emphasis in evaluat-
ing country and transfer risks was on cross-border
lending and on lending by local ofﬁces in a currency
other than that of the host country. This emphasis
reﬂected the view that credit extended in a foreign
currency to local borrowers by local ofﬁces was
exposed to many of the same risks as cross-border
loans. Credits in local currencies funded locally were
a lesser concern, as the host country could, in prin-
ciple, always meet local currency demands, even if
the cost was rising inﬂation rates.8
By the mid-1990s, the role of U.S. dollars in retail
and business transactions abroad had become more
6. Country risk comprises all the risks that arise from the eco-
nomic, social, legal, and political conditions of a foreign country that
may have favorable or adverse consequences for loans (or invest-
ments) by foreigners to parties in that country. Transfer risk refers to
the possibility that a country will be unable to provide local borrowers
with sufﬁcient access to foreign currencies that they can meet foreign
obligations denominated in those currencies.
7. BIS reporting countries are the G-10 countries, Austria, Den-
mark, Finland, Ireland, Norway, and Spain; non–BIS reporting coun-
tries are essentially the nonindustrial countries.
8. However, local currency credits extended in excess of local
currency liabilities, that is, funded with foreign currency or offshore
borrowing, were included in measures of transfer risk.
606 Federal Reserve Bulletin September 1999prominent. Local dollar markets developed in some
countries, and the risks associated with foreign cur-
rency credits in those countries began to resemble
the risks associated with other local loans rather than
those characteristic of cross-border credits. The U.S.
country exposure survey was changed to take these
developments into account. Rather than net local
currency positions, the banking agencies now con-
sider net local country positions, that is, the amount
of credit extended to local parties relative to the
amount raised from them. The change has been
meaningful in certain cases, particularly in relation to
Argentina, but has had little effect on reported ﬁgures
overall.
Since 1997, the Federal Reserve has also moni-
tored U.S. bank exposures to foreign counterparties
arising from unrealized gains from foreign exchange
transactions and derivatives products.9 Although
these exposures have always been an element of
transfer risk, they have increased signiﬁcantly in
recent years along with the growth of the underlying
activities. With the addition of this information and
the reporting change described in the preceding para-
graph, the supervisory measure of transfer risk has
become the sum of cross-border claims, net local
country claims, and claims resulting from revaluation
gains.
The need to monitor exposures arising from revalu-
ation gains was demonstrated following Indonesia’s
currency crisis in 1997. In lending to Indonesian
borrowers, some banks had attempted to reduce or
eliminate their currency exposures by hedging the
risk through contracts with local institutions, which
in turn committed to paying dollars in the future at a
ﬁxed rate of exchange. As the country’s ﬁnancial and
economic problems grew, the U.S. dollar value of its
currency, the rupiah, plunged, as did the dollar value
of the U.S. banks’ rupiah-denominated loans. How-
ever, the offsetting gains on the hedging contracts
also increased the credit exposure of U.S. banks
to Indonesian counterparties. Unfortunately, many of
these counterparties were also weakened by ﬁnancial
and economic conditions in Indonesia and defaulted
on their obligations to U.S. banks. The episode high-
lights the importance of monitoring counterparty
exposures under relevant stress scenarios.
Borrower Nationality
U.S. bank claims involving transfer risk amounted
to $516 billion at the end of 1998 (table 4). Over the
years, claims on borrowers residing in industrial
countries have been far greater than claims on bor-
rowers in any other group of countries, mainly be-
cause of the importance of the industrial economies
in global economic activity, the prominence of their
ﬁnancial markets (especially London), and the rela-
tively strong credit ratings of the countries and their
major banks and corporations. Claims on parties in
the G-10 and other developed countries at the end of
1998, totaling $379 billion, represented nearly three-
fourths of all transfer risk held by U.S. banks and
have consistently accounted for roughly half or more
of that risk. By the end of 1998, roughly one-third of
this dollar value was related to trading and deriva-
tives transactions.
U.S. bank transfer risk claims on borrowers in
Latin American and Caribbean countries declined
sharply over 1988–91 as the region’s foreign debt
payment problems became severe and widespread.
From a peak of $91 billion in 1984, including claims
on Brazil and Mexico of roughly $27 billion each,
U.S. bank exposure to the region dropped as low as
$38 billion in 1991 before rising to the current level
($66 billion). Relative to the total capital of the
lending banks, exposure to Latin American and
Caribbean countries has declined even further. For
large U.S. money center banks, which hold more than
70 percent of all U.S. bank claims on the region, the
amount of transfer risk exposure equals roughly one-
quarter of their combined capital accounts. In the
early and mid-1980s, that ﬁgure was well over
100 percent.
Transfer risk claims of U.S. banks on emerging
Asian economies followed a similar track, declin-
ing from a peak of $45 billion in 1983 to a low of
$22 billion in 1989. By 1993, exposures were again
growing rapidly, building to a peak of $55 billion
in 1997, including $11 billion of revaluation gains
on foreign exchange and derivatives contracts. U.S.
banks were not alone in increasing their exposures,
as Japanese and European banks were particularly
active in providing new ﬁnancing. Most of the U.S.
bank funding (like most international lending in gen-
eral) was short term, however, and bank exposures
fell sharply following the Asian market problems
that began that year. By the end of 1998, transfer risk
claims of U.S. banks on these countries had fallen
to $36 billion, largely as a result of asset sales and
charge-offs.
9. When trades and derivatives transactions are initiated, by deﬁni-
tion they are done at market rates, with no economic gain or loss to
either party. Immediately thereafter, however, market rates and prices
begin to change, and one party beneﬁts. As this happens, the party
beneﬁting incurs a risk that the other party will default, causing losses
just as if the underlying transaction had been a loan.
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since the removal of the Berlin Wall, but transfer risk
claims remain small ($4.9 billion at the end of 1998).
Claims on Russia peaked at $5.8 billion in 1997
but fell to $0.9 billion by the end of 1998 after
the country announced a moratorium on public-sector
debt.
Although of lesser concern to supervisors, foreign
bank lending in local currencies of funds raised
locally has also grown in the 1990s. Such lending
totaled $314.1 billion at the end of 1998, compared
with $140.2 billion at the end of 1990. (These loans
are reﬂected only partially in table 4, under ‘‘Net
local country claims.’’)
Concentration among U.S. Lenders
Mergers and acquisitions among large U.S. banking
organizations since the mid-1980s have concentrated
foreign lending among fewer U.S. banks. At the end
of 1998, for example, a separately monitored group
of six large money center banks held 83 percent of all
transfer risk claims of U.S. banks. In 1986 that group
consisted of nine banks, but it held only 58 percent
of all such claims. A common statistic for measuring
market concentration is the Herﬁndahl–Hirschman
index, which does so by summing the squared market
shares of participating institutions. From 1986 to
1998, according to Federal Reserve staff calculations,
the index more than doubled, rising from 800 to
1623.10
Trading and Derivatives Activities
As noted, traditional asset-based measures can be
misleading as a gauge of the scale and scope of
today’s large, complex banking organizations. The
inadequacy of such measures is due in large part to
the growing importance of securities markets and
related trading and derivatives activities. Rather than
extending and funding loans in traditional ways and
thereby increasing their assets, many large commer-
10. For reference (though not applicable to this case), the U.S.
Department of Justice deﬁnes a market as unconcentrated if the index
is less than 1000 and highly concentrated if it is greater than 1800.
Otherwise, the market is considered to be ‘‘moderately’’ concentrated.
4. Country exposure of U.S. insured commercial banks, as measured by transfer risk, selected years, 1978–98
Billions of dollars
Country of borrower or guarantor
Transfer risk claims Composition of transfer risk for 1998













G-10 and Switzerland .............. 100.2 183.0 169.7 155.4 174.3 263.4 318.3 203.3 94.8 20.2 318.3
Non–G-10 developed countries ..... 20.4 45.8 27.5 29.3 43.9 62.7 60.9 35.1 15.4 10.4 60.9
Eastern Europe .................... 5.8 4.6 3.1 1.5 7.1 9.1 4.9 4.3 .5 .1 4.9
Bulgaria ........................ .6 .1 .1 .1 .2 .2 .1 .1 .0 .0 .1
Czech Republic ................. .2 .2 .0 .0 1.2 .6 .7 .5 .2 .0 .7
Hungary ........................ .8 .9 .3 .4 .7 .5 .7 .5 .2 .0 .7
Poland .......................... 1.2 .9 .3 .4 1.0 .9 1.7 1.6 * .1 1.7
Russia .......................... 1.2 .1 .5 .3 3.3 5.8 .9 .8 .1 * .9
Other ........................... 1.8 2.4 1.9 .3 .7 1.1 .8 .8 .0 .0 .8
Latin America and the Caribbean ... 44.9 87.5 67.1 50.1 69.0 72.5 66.5 55.1 2.3 9.1 66.5
Argentina ....................... 2.6 9.1 8.2 8.7 11.8 11.6 11.0 8.5 .5 2.0 11.0
Brazil .......................... 14.2 24.1 22.0 9.9 22.8 23.2 17.6 14.1 .4 3.2 17.6
Chile ........................... 1.4 6.1 5.0 4.1 7.6 7.0 5.7 3.9 .1 1.7 5.7
Mexico ......................... 10.3 25.4 17.7 17.6 14.8 16.4 18.2 16.1 1.0 1.2 18.2
Other ........................... 16.4 22.8 14.2 9.8 12.0 14.3 14.0 12.5 .3 1.0 14.0
Asia .............................. 22.9 44.5 22.5 31.4 50.8 54.9 35.8 23.4 5.1 7.3 35.8
China, People’s Republic ........ * 1.4 .6 .8 2.6 3.1 1.8 1.2 .4 .3 1.8
China, Taiwan .................. 3.2 4.9 3.0 4.1 5.2 4.1 3.6 2.7 .2 .7 3.6
Korea .......................... 4.3 13.1 6.4 8.6 16.5 21.4 12.9 7.8 1.9 3.1 12.9
Malaysia ....................... .8 2.1 .6 2.0 2.9 3.4 2.1 .7 .2 1.2 2.1
Philippines ...................... 3.0 5.9 4.1 2.1 4.3 2.5 2.2 1.6 .1 .5 2.2
Thailand ........................ 1.4 2.8 1.3 3.1 6.5 6.0 2.9 .9 .7 1.3 2.9
Other ........................... 10.2 14.3 6.5 10.7 12.8 14.4 10.3 8.5 1.6 .2 10.3
Africa ............................ 5.2 7.3 2.7 1.3 1.4 1.7 1.6 1.2 .2 .2 1.6
Offshore banking centers ........... 7.5 15.9 7.8 14.3 23.6 31.5 23.2 18.0 3.9 1.3 23.2
International and regional
organizations ................. .4 1.0 1.6 1.3 1.1 3.5 5.1 2.6 2.5 .0 5.1
Total .............................. 207.4 389.6 301.8 284.4 371.2 499.2 516.3 342.9 124.8 48.6 516.3
*Less than $50 million.
608 Federal Reserve Bulletin September 1999cial banks (those in the United States, in particular)
are seeking more and more to securitize and sell
pools of loans to investors, and then to service the
assets that they and other ﬁnancial institutions have
sold. Securitizing and selling loans minimizes asset
growth, frees funds for additional lending, and may
contribute to more efﬁcient use of bank capital.
In the process of originating and securitizing
assets, managing their own market exposures, provid-
ing ﬁnancial services to customers, and pursuing
market opportunities, banks are increasing their vol-
ume of off-balance-sheet transactions. Most of these
activities, in turn, involve trading and derivatives
activities and can also create additional needs for
foreign ofﬁces.
Throughout the 1990s, trading assets increased
rather steadily as a share of all U.S. commercial bank
assets, rising from 2.0 percent at the end of 1990 to
5.2 percent ($285 billion) at the end of 1998. More
than 60 percent of those assets were booked abroad,
principally in London but also, notably, in Tokyo and
Singapore. Indeed, as indicated earlier, much of the
recent growth of foreign branch and subsidiary assets
has been due to the higher level of trading activities.
Nearly all the derivatives transactions of U.S. banks
(95 percent) are managed within the trading function,
and much of the activity heavily involves overseas
ofﬁces. Nearly all the transactions (97 percent) are
based on interest rate and foreign exchange rate
contracts, with interest rate contracts commanding a
dominant and growing share.
By a common measure—notional value (the face
value of ﬁnancial instruments upon which counter-
party payments are based)—the derivatives activities
of U.S. banks have grown markedly in recent years,
from $6.8 trillion at the beginning of the decade to
$33.0 trillion at the end of 1998. Last year, notional
values rose 32 percent because of soaring volumes in
the third quarter as institutions adjusted their expo-
sures after Russia’s default and the near failure of
Long-Term Capital Management, a large, highly
leveraged hedge fund. In each of the following two
quarters (through March 1999), however, notional
values declined slightly, the ﬁrst consecutive quar-
terly declines in this measure during the ten years for
which data are available.
Notional values dramatically overstate the eco-
nomic signiﬁcance and risks these transactions
present, however. Another measure—fair value (the
estimated replacement costs of the contracts)—often
serves better and is typically much smaller than the
notional value of a derivatives portfolio (0.5 percent
to 2.0 percent). If the amounts U.S. banks owe to or
are owed by individual counterparties on derivatives
transactions are netted on a bilateral basis consistent
with FIN 39, the fair value of all derivatives trans-
actions of U.S. banks totaled $173 billion at the end
of 1998, or 0.5 percent of the total notional value.
Trading and derivatives activities are heavily concen-
trated among the large money center banks, increas-
ingly the same institutions that are most active abroad
(table 5).
FOREIGN BANK PARTICIPATION
IN U.S. BANKING MARKETS
The large and open economy of the United States,
combined with the key role of its currency in world
markets, has attracted foreign banks and investors to
this country throughout its history. British merchant
banks ﬁnanced much of the trade with the colonies
and established ofﬁces here in the mid-1700s. Other
foreign banks operated formal banking agencies in
New York shortly after the Civil War. Their efforts
and capital were especially helpful in ﬁnancing the
growth of the U.S. railroads.
In recent decades, the U.S. banking assets of for-
eign banks have grown rapidly, climbing from
$27 billion and 3.6 percent of U.S.-booked commer-
cial banking assets in 1972 to $1.1 trillion and a
23 percent market share at the end of 1998 (table 6).
Most of these assets—around 80 percent—are held in
foreign bank branches and agencies located in the
United States.11
As have U.S. bank holding companies, many for-
eign banks have also established or acquired U.S.
nonbank ﬁnancial companies, such as leasing and
ﬁnance companies, and U.S. securities subsidiaries,
11. The assets of U.S. branches and agencies of foreign banks
exclude substantial other assets that are managed by these ofﬁces but
are booked in the Caribbean. U.S. agencies of foreign banks are
similar to branch ofﬁces, except that, unlike branches, agencies have
limited or no deposit-taking powers. Rather than providing funds to
borrowers by granting the borrower a deposit to draw upon, an agency
issues the borrower a ‘‘credit balance.’’ In that context, deposits and
credit balances are much the same. However, branches may also issue
deposits (for example, CDs) to investors and other parties with whom
they have no other relationship. Generally, agencies may not do that
and must rely on other types of borrowing to fund their activities.
Their credit balances must be ‘‘incidental to or [arise from] the
exercise of other lawful banking powers.’’ In practice, the differences
between branches and agencies are often subtle. Both types of ofﬁces
are integral parts of their parents; both have lending powers that are
based on the capital of the consolidated bank; and the Federal Reserve
treats the credit balances of the agencies as deposits in determining
reserve requirements. Branches and agencies established since 1991
have not been permitted to accept domestic retail deposits or to obtain
FDIC insurance; a small number of foreign bank branches established
before 1991 may accept FDIC-insured deposits.
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Steagall Act.12 At the end of 1998, these nonbank
companies held assets exceeding $800 billion, with
section 20 and similar U.S. securities afﬁliates
accounting for more than $500 billion of the total.
Before the 1970s, almost all the foreign banks
having ofﬁces in the United States were large banks
from major industrial nations or were the largest or
second-largest banks in their home countries; by the
end of 1975, 20 percent of the foreign banks having
U.S. banking ofﬁces were not among the world’s top
500, and by 1985 that ﬁgure had increased to 34 per-
cent. The number of foreign banks with ofﬁces in the
United States also rose during the 1980s, from 153 at
the beginning of the decade and to a peak of 294 at
the end of 1991.
Much of the buildup to 1991 was driven by the
entry of more than two dozen additional Japanese
banks in the preceding four years. Those banks raised
Japan’s total to 55, the largest number, by far, for any
nationality. Japan’s economic problems in the 1990s,
however, led to a signiﬁcant retrenchment in the
international activities of its banks and to a reversal
of their earlier U.S. growth. By the end of 1998, the
number of Japanese banks had dropped to 35 and
their U.S. operations were much smaller than they
had been ten years earlier.
The number of European banks with U.S. ofﬁces
also declined during the 1990s, from a peak of 103 in
1989 to 81 at the close of 1998. However, this decline
was due more to mergers and acquisitions among
banks throughout the continent than to any strategic
retreat from U.S. markets.
In structuring their activities, foreign banks gener-
ally have the same choices regarding the types of
12. Section 20 of the Banking Act of 1933 (part of the Glass–
Steagall Act) prohibits a bank from being afﬁliated with a company
engaged ‘‘principally’’ in underwriting or dealing in securities. In
1989 the Federal Reserve interpreted that provision as permitting
holding companies to own securities afﬁliates that engage in otherwise
impermissible securities activities if the revenues from those activities
did not account for more than 10 percent of the afﬁliate’s total
revenues. In 1997, the percentage limitation was raised to 25 percent.
The securities afﬁliates that U.S. bank holding companies established
following this interpretation are referred to as ‘‘section 20’’ subsidi-
aries. By regulation, most of their activities must involve trading and
dealing in U.S. government securities and other ﬁnancial instruments
also permissible to U.S. banks. Foreign banks are also allowed to own
such companies.
5. Trading, derivatives, and international activities of selected U.S. insured commercial banks, year-end 1998
Billions of dollars except as noted
Bank





Domestic ofﬁces Foreign ofﬁces Total Notional value
Revaluation gain
Domestic ofﬁces Foreign ofﬁces
Morgan Guaranty Trust Company .. 37.8 53.0 90.8 8,653.6 25.5 23.6 53.6
Chase Manhattan Bank ............. 11.2 37.7 48.9 10,261.5 7.2 25.5 36.4
Bankers Trust Company ........... 7.7 32.3 40.0 2,524.1 3.3 14.3 62.5
Citibank NA ...................... 5.5 26.2 31.7 3,625.3 5.2 20.6 68.4
NationsBank NA1 ................. 21.3 .6 21.9 2,700.9 7.1 .4 4.4
Bank of America NT&SA1 ......... 7.6 10.5 18.1 1,870.2 5.7 3.7 24.9
First National Bank of Chicago ..... 2.7 4.9 7.6 1,421.3 1.8 4.3 22.4
First Union NB .................... 7.0 .0 7.0 268.9 1.7 .0 9.0
Republic NB of NY ................ 2.7 1.5 4.2 194.9 1.9 .5 31.0
BankBoston NA ................... 2.0 1.1 3.1 147.9 1.7 .4 30.7
State Street B&TC ................. 1.5 .1 1.6 139.2 1.2 .0 26.3
Bank of New York ................. 1.3 .3 1.6 274.6 1.0 .3 21.7
Subtotal ........................... 108.2 168.2 276.4 32,082.4 63.2 93.4 32.9
All other banks .................... 8.5 .3 8.7 918.2 2.6 .3 1.6
Total ............................. 116.7 168.5 285.1 33,000.6 65.8 93.7 12.9 2
1. These banks are now controlled by a single bank holding company,
BankAmerica Corporation.
2. Asset-weighted average.
6. Assets of U.S. banking ofﬁces of foreign banks,
selected years, 1975–98
























1975 ... 38 12 50 4.6 79
1980 ... 148 68 216 11.8 153
1985 ... 312 111 424 14.9 244
1990 ... 628 148 776 23.7 283
1995 ... 763 201 964 24.1 275
1996 ... 822 189 1,011 24.1 267
1997 ... 927 214 1,141 25.0 264
1998 ... 903 231 1,134 22.6 243
610 Federal Reserve Bulletin September 1999ofﬁces to open in the United States that U.S. banks
have abroad, and they face similar advantages and
disadvantages with each type. As with U.S. banks,
foreign banks generally prefer to operate through
branch ofﬁces, although subsidiaries offer some key
features.
U.S. Branches and Agencies
As with U.S. banks operating abroad, foreign banks
prefer to operate in the United States through
branches (and agencies) because of the broad bank-
ing powers afforded such ofﬁces. Throughout the
1980s, Japanese banks heavily dominated the ﬁgures
for assets of U.S. branches and agencies of foreign
banks, building their share to nearly 60 percent by
the end of 1990. Although they remain the larg-
est national contingent, their assets have declined
markedly, from $373 billion at year-end 1990 to
$215 billion—and only a 24 percent share—at year-
end 1998 (table 7).
As the assets of Japanese banks declined, those of
French, German, and Canadian banks climbed, with
each accounting for more than $100 billion at year-
end 1998. Combined, these three nationalities now
account for more than 40 percent of the assets of all
U.S. branch and agency ofﬁces of foreign banks.
With the addition of 5 percent to 7 percent shares
each of Dutch, Swiss, and British banks, the ‘‘foreign
bank share’’ of the U.S. banking market is much
more diversiﬁed among foreign nationalities today
than it was a decade ago. At the end of 1998, the
Herﬁndahl–Hirschman index for this segment of the
market was 1465, less than half the ‘‘highly concen-
trated’’ level of 3775 ten years before.
The composite balance sheet of U.S. branches and
agencies has also changed notably during the past
decade. In 1988, the activities of these ofﬁces were
oriented more heavily toward interbank business,
with more than one-half of ofﬁce assets and nearly
three-quarters of their funding related to afﬁliates
and other banks; by the end of 1998, the propor-
7. Assets of U.S. branches and agencies of foreign banks, by country of parent bank, selected years, 1988–98
Billions of dollars except as noted
Parent country 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996
1998
Amount Percent
Europe .......................................... 139.5 176.5 269.0 292.5 392.4 519.4 57.5
Austria ....................................... 1.2 2.4 4.2 4.1 4.4 7.6 .8
Belgium ...................................... 3.1 4.6 4.8 3.9 5.5 8.4 .9
France ........................................ 25.1 32.5 73.3 90.0 127.6 132.7 14.7
Germany ..................................... 13.0 16.2 30.8 43.3 78.6 139.4 15.4
Italy .......................................... 39.0 47.0 39.2 34.3 29.6 33.1 3.7
Netherlands ................................... 8.5 10.7 20.4 18.4 30.7 47.5 5.3
Spain ......................................... 3.8 7.6 7.8 8.6 10.8 15.2 1.7
Sweden ....................................... .3 5.3 11.8 6.9 7.5 15.0 1.7
Switzerland ................................... 23.9 25.6 44.0 47.9 53.6 60.1 6.7
United Kingdom .............................. 15.1 16.2 22.0 23.7 32.3 46.7 5.2
Other ......................................... 6.5 8.4 10.7 11.3 12.0 13.7 1.5
Latin America ................................... 11.3 12.2 11.8 10.7 12.4 12.6 1.4
Argentina ..................................... .9 1.0 1.2 1.5 2.0 1.2 .1
Brazil ........................................ 3.9 3.9 3.5 4.2 4.0 4.0 .4
Mexico ....................................... 3.7 4.7 3.6 2.2 2.9 3.0 .3
Venezuela .................................... 1.4 1.4 1.6 1.0 1.2 1.4 .2
Other ......................................... 1.4 1.4 1.9 1.8 2.3 3.0 .3
Asia and Middle East ............................ 330.6 402.8 377.8 385.8 348.8 252.9 28.0
China, People’s Republic ...................... 1.0 1.4 2.4 3.1 2.4 2.6 .3
China, Taiwan ................................ 2.3 3.6 5.7 8.5 10.1 10.5 1.2
Hong Kong ................................... 2.9 3.8 4.8 5.8 5.6 2.5 .3
Israel ......................................... 3.5 3.9 4.2 4.6 5.0 6.0 .7
Japan ......................................... 307.8 373.0 344.3 342.3 298.7 215.4 23.9
Korea ........................................ 4.1 6.4 8.5 12.5 16.6 6.1 .7
Singapore ..................................... .4 .9 1.1 1.8 2.4 2.5 .3
Other ......................................... 8.8 9.9 6.7 7.3 8.0 7.3 .8
Africa .......................................... .4 .2 .1 .1 .1 .2 *
Other ........................................... 33.1 36.1 53.6 52.2 68.7 117.7 13.0
Australia ..................................... 3.8 6.5 7.2 5.1 7.8 9.0 1.0
Canada ....................................... 28.4 28.5 45.0 47.2 60.9 108.8 12.0
Other ......................................... .9 1.1 1.4 ****
Total ........................................... 514.9 627.9 712.4 741.3 822.4 902.8 100.0
*Less than 0.05 percent or $50 million.
International Activities of U.S. Banks and in U.S. Banking Markets 611tions had declined to about one-third and one-half
respectively.
Japanese banks are an exception to this pattern: At
the end of 1998, they derived half their funding from
the parent, a share typically much larger than that for
the U.S. ofﬁces of banks from other developed coun-
tries. This funding pattern is due largely to the access
their parents have to low-cost funding in Japan, weak
loan demand in that country, and the fact that when
borrowing in non-Japanese ﬁnancial markets, Japa-
nese banks must pay premium rates because of their
lower credit ratings.
Foreign banks have historically considered com-
mercial lending an important role for their U.S.
ofﬁces, and they have continued to do so. U.S.
branches and agencies of foreign banks held 18 per-
cent of the U.S. commercial and industrial lending
market at the beginning of the 1990s and as much as
27 percent of the market in early 1997; by the end of
1998, however, their share had declined to 23 per-
cent. Trading activities are also important at these
ofﬁces, as they are for large, internationally active
banks generally. Among foreign banks, large Euro-
pean banks dominate the activity; for them, trading
assets account for nearly 10 percent of all the assets
of their U.S. branches and agencies.
At the end of 1998, nearly 80 percent of the assets
of U.S. branches and agencies were booked in
New York City; Chicago, at 7 percent, had the next-
highest share. Los Angeles and San Francisco
together hosted 19 percent of the foreign bank ofﬁces
(84 of the 454) but accounted for less than 5 percent
of ofﬁce assets.
U.S. Subsidiaries
Much consumer business requires a subsidiary bank,
often with its own branch network and local identity.
Foreign investors that seek this business have two
options: to establish a new bank or to buy an existing
one. During the 1970s and early 1980s, foreign banks
sought acquisitions to beneﬁt from what they per-
ceived as low-priced U.S. bank stocks and, in the case
of the larger acquisitions, to gain an immediate and
signiﬁcant market share. Foreign private individuals
also acquired U.S. banks during that time.
Even banks pursuing wholesale business can ﬁnd
purchasing another bank the most efﬁcient way to
acquire necessary talent and market share, as indi-
cated by Deutsche Bank’s recent acquisition of Bank-
ers Trust Company of New York. Other notable U.S.
banks that are owned by foreign banks include
Marine Midland Bank (owned by Hong Kong and
Shanghai Banking Corporation), Union Bank of Cali-
fornia (Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi), Harris Trust
(Bank of Montreal), and LaSalle Bank (ABN Amro,
of the Netherlands).
Such acquisitions can provide investors with key
elements of an international or global banking net-
work and can create synergies with their other opera-
tions. Like any venture, they also carry risks and do
not always succeed as planned. In addition to the
difﬁculties that geographic distance can create in
communicating and in coordinating actions, foreign
acquisitions also introduce cultural differences and
can pose further problems if acquirers do not ad-
equately understand local banking markets and prac-
tices. The loss of key personnel, for whatever reason,
can quickly undermine the business if activities are
not managed and coordinated well.
Such mishaps have also occurred in the other direc-
tion. Particularly in the mid-1980s, U.S. banks
acquired several British securities ﬁrms after the
United Kingdom reduced regulations governing
much of its ﬁnancial system. Using new opportuni-
ties to enter the market, many U.S. and foreign banks
paid large premiums to acquire British broker–dealers
in order to expand their own securities activities and
to gain footholds in debt and equity markets that were
expected to enjoy rapid growth. Cultural differences
(mostly between banking and securities ﬁrms) com-
bined with the initial excessive euphoria to produce
unsatisfactory results. Revenues frequently fell short
of targets, or sometimes even of operating costs.
After a few years, many of the new entrants sold or
closed their acquired operations, and the local indus-
try shrank to a more sustainable size.
CONCLUSION
The continuing growth of international banking and
the strengthening of links between banking and secu-
rities markets have produced larger, more diversiﬁed
ﬁnancial institutions and further concentration of
international activities among fewer U.S. banks.
These trends are not unique to U.S. banking but apply
to ﬁnancial markets broadly. They are likely to con-
tinue as industry consolidation moves worldwide;
the recently completed or proposed acquisitions by
foreign banks of two large U.S. commercial banks,
Bankers Trust and Republic National Bank of
New York, support that point.
To central bankers and bank supervisors, consoli-
dation in banking (whether domestic or international)
brings both comfort and concern. On the one hand,
consolidation should offer surviving institutions
612 Federal Reserve Bulletin September 1999greater ﬁnancial strength and diversiﬁcation of risks
along with larger asset size and equity base. On the
other hand, greater concentration of decisionmaking
within the industry can lead to larger problems when
they occur. Large problems, in turn, raise the specter
of systemic risks.
Events of the past several years also provide evi-
dence of the increased speed with which ﬁnancial
problems move around the globe and serve to vali-
date concerns that central bankers have expressed for
some time about the effects of technology and ﬁnan-
cial innovation. Although Russia’s debt moratorium
was a relatively small event in terms of international
banking and capital market ﬂows, it caused investors
throughout the world to reassess their risks. For
some countries and institutions, the consequences in
reduced liquidity were immediate and widespread.
As nonbank investors play an ever-more-important
role in ﬁnancing economic growth, ﬁnancial informa-
tion about major borrowers is likely to become more
available. Investor demands for greater transparency
about risks would complement efforts by interna-
tional bank supervisors and the International Mone-
tary Fund to promote greater disclosure and should
help bring about still broader, more efﬁcient ﬁnancial
markets.
International banking has long provided attractive
opportunities to U.S. and foreign banks and will
clearly do so in the years ahead. The key to taking
advantage of the opportunities, as always, is under-
standing the risks and potential returns. Further gains
by banks and other ﬁnancial institutions in measuring
and managing risks will enhance this understanding.
As the links among banking and ﬁnancial markets
multiply and more events have sudden worldwide
effects, supervisory agencies throughout the world
will also need to continue—indeed, to strengthen—
their efforts to coordinate the regulation and over-
sight of large banks and other ﬁnancial institutions.
Through the Bank for International Settlements, a
substantial framework for conducting this work is
already in place (see box). By developing their rules
in ways compatible with sound market practice,
supervisors can contribute most to a healthy and
responsive international banking system for the new
millennium.
Guidelines for International Banking: The Basel Committee on Bank Supervision
The presence of foreign banks in local economies and their
effects on national and global ﬁnancial markets have long
made it necessary for national authorities to communicate
with their counterparts abroad. As the volume of interna-
tional banking has increased in recent decades, so too has
the need for bank supervisors and regulators to coordinate
their efforts.
Since the mid-1970s, the Bank for International Settle-
ments (BIS) in Basel, Switzerland, has performed an impor-
tant role in facilitating the development and coordination of
international bank supervisory policies, principally through
its support of the Basel Committee on Bank Supervision.
The committee, which includes the heads of supervision
of the banking agencies of each of the G-10 countries and
Switzerland, set forth fundamental principles for allocating
supervisory responsibilities between home and host country
authorities when it adopted the 1975 ‘‘Concordat.’’ Since
then the committee has produced the industry’s current
capital standard (the 1988 Basel Capital Accord) and has
provided leadership in many other international bank super-
visory matters.
Recent initiatives include, most notably, a 1997 amend-
ment to the Accord addressing market risks that establishes
new capital requirements for bank trading activities—
requirements determined on the basis of ‘‘value at risk’’
calculations derived from banks’ own internal models. Such
an approach represents a new paradigm for bank regulation,
one that is also being evaluated for credit risk. The commit-
tee has also produced guidance on sound risk-management
practices for credit risk, for the management of derivatives
activities and interest rate risk, and for other important bank
operating and disclosure practices.
Although the committee is composed of ofﬁcials of only
major industrialized countries, its policies and standards
have been adopted throughout the world. More than one
hundred countries implement the 1988 Capital Accord, for
example, and many of them also urge their banks to adopt
other sound banking practices identiﬁed by the committee.
To foster stronger bank supervision worldwide, the com-
mittee in 1992 adopted minimum standards for consolidated
supervision and in 1997 identiﬁed core principles of
supervision—twenty-ﬁve elements of the supervisory pro-
cess that the committee believes are necessary for an effec-
tive bank supervisory program. Bank supervisory agencies
worldwide are encouraged to adhere to these principles and
to evaluate their own practices periodically. The full docu-
ment describing the core principles and other statements
issued by the committee are available on the BIS web site:
www.bis.org.
International Activities of U.S. Banks and in U.S. Banking Markets 613A.1 Number of foreign branches of Federal Reserve member banks, by location, selected years, 1965–98
Location 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1998
Europe .................. 43 116 166 186 210 157 131 141
Belgium .............. 4 10 1089555
France ................ 4 12 19 15 12 11 9 8
Germany ............. 6 21 27 27 18 15 8 10
Greece ............... 1 9 17 16 21 22 26 32
Italy .................. 1 4 9 15 22 12 11 11
Luxembourg .......... 0 1543111
Netherlands ........... 3 7663223
Spain ................. 0 0 0 8 15 13 11 9
Switzerland ........... 1 7 9 9 12 11 7 7
United Kingdom ...... 21 44 49 53 68 42 30 30
Other ................. 2 1 15 25 27 23 21 25
Latin America ........... 75 168 133 165 216 239 242 354
Argentina ............. 17 38 32 45 63 81 94 216
Brazil ................ 15 16 18 19 19 44 50 13
Chile ................. 3 17 1 6 30 40 39 44
Colombia ............. 6 26000000
Panama ............... 12 29 30 32 28 20 18 22
Other ................. 22 42 52 63 76 54 41 59
Caribbean ............... 13 116 162 193 193 155 124 108
Bahamas ............. 3 61 73 75 74 52 39 27
Cayman Islands ....... 0 0 47 79 91 80 70 67
Other ................. 10 55 42 39 28 23 15 14
Asia .................... 50 79 112 161 202 189 184 220
Hong Kong ........... 6 13 23 43 73 57 43 52
India ................. 6 11 9 10 10 11 12 15
Indonesia ............. 0 6555678
Japan ................. 14 15 31 29 30 33 36 37
Korea ................ 0 3 3 12 19 24 22 23
Philippines ............ 5 4 4 14 15 13 10 12
Singapore ............. 8 11 20 26 25 20 16 19
Other ................. 11 16 17 22 25 25 38 54
Africa .................. 2 2 8 19 22 14 17 20
Middle East ............. 5 12 20 31 31 22 22 23
U.S. territories ........... 23 43 65 53 46 49 29 35
Other ................... 0 00001 1 1 1 5
Total ................... 211 536 666 808 920 826 760 916
614 Federal Reserve Bulletin September 1999A.2 Assets of foreign branches of Federal Reserve member banks, by location, selected years, 1965–98
Billions of dollars
Location 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1998
Europe .............................. 5.6 39.2 92.0 170.3 154.0 137.0 287.3 336.4
Belgium .......................... 4.0 6.8 7.4 8.0 10.7 11.9
France ............................ 7.4 12.1 10.3 7.0 10.6 5.0
Germany ......................... 6.3 5.9 6.2 4.2 6.1 5.5
Greece ........................... 1.0 2.2 2.3 2.4 4.3 4.8
Italy .............................. 2.0 4.3 4.5 2.8 12.7 5.0
Netherlands ....................... 1.0 1.6 1.0 1.7 2.0 2.4
Spain ............................. .0 1.5 3.9 7.2 8.6 2.9
Switzerland ....................... 1.0 2.2 2.8 2.7 1.5 .8
United Kingdom .................. 4.3 29.7 67.6 129.5 112.0 92.8 220.8 284.8
Other ............................. 1.7 4.2 3.6 8.2 10.0 13.3
Latin America ....................... .9 2.1 6.7 15.0 11.3 8.1 18.5 31.7
Argentina ......................... .2 2.4 1.4 1.6 7.5 16.3
Brazil ............................ .7 2.2 3.4 2.9 5.0 4.6
Chile ............................. * .3 1.1 1.7 3.0 4.7
Panama ........................... 4.8 8.0 4.2 .8 1.4 2.0
Other ............................. .9 2.1 1.2 1.1 1.6 4.1
Caribbean ........................... .9 4.4 37.7 97.8 86.0 80.5 146.3 203.2
Bahamas ......................... 30.9 68.9 47.9 43.1 75.6 73.3
Cayman Islands ................... 5.9 26.9 37.0 36.7 70.1 128.9
Other ............................. .9 2.0 1.1 .7 .6 1.0
Asia ................................ 1.7 4.4 21.0 46.2 59.7 67.4 123.7 161.4
Hong Kong ....................... 2.6 7.7 11.3 16.2 28.7 38.2
India ............................. .2 .4 .9 3.1 3.5 5.2
Indonesia ......................... .3 .5 1.0 1.4 2.3 2.3
Japan ............................. 10.2 18.9 18.0 15.9 31.2 38.4
Korea ............................ .3 1.8 3.4 4.8 8.5 9.8
Philippines ........................ .5 3.1 3.5 2.2 2.9 3.3
Singapore ......................... 5.7 11.2 16.1 16.0 27.7 42.4
Other ............................. 1.2 2.6 5.5 7.8 18.9 21.8
Africa .............................. ** .1 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.8 4.0
Middle East ......................... .1 .3 2.1 7.0 5.4 3.8 8.4 8.2
U.S. territories ....................... .6 2.2 3.1 6.0 12.0 5.9 6.9 11.1
Other ............................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6 6.5 11.5
Total ............................... 9.8 52.6 162.7 343.5 329.2 304.4 599.4 767.5
Note. Gross assets, including claims on afﬁliates. For 1965 and 1970, further
details by country are not available. Assets are not adjusted to reﬂect further
FIN 39 netting by the head ofﬁces of banks.
. . . Not applicable.
* Less than $50 million.
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